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IN THE SL'PREME COURT OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant/Respondent,

:
:

v.

:

ELROY TILLMAN,

:

Appellee/Petitioner.

Case No. 20030148-SC

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals the partial grant of a petition for post-conviction relief which
challenged petitioner Tillman's conviction and sentence for capital murder, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202. Tillman's conviction was not vacated, however the district
court ordered that his sentence of death be vacated and that a new sentencing hearing be
con\ ened (RULING ON PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - addendum A). This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (2001) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue I: Did the post-conviction court err in concluding that undisclosed transcripts
were "material" under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)?
Standard of Review: On appeal from a ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief,
the appellate court reviews the post-conviction court's conclusions of law for correctness.

according no deference to the post-conviction court's conclusions. IVickham i Galcika.
2002 I T 72, H7, 61 P.3d 978 (citing Parsons v Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,518 (Utah 1994). ccrr
denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994)). Findings of fact are disturbed only if thev are clearK
erroneous. Uacthens v Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998).
Preservation:

In the post-conviction action below, the State argued that the

transcripts v\ ere not material. The State appeals from the court's order granting the petition
for post-conviction relief.
Issue II: In this third state post-conviction proceeding, did the post-conviction court
err in granting relief on a claim Tillman could have raised in his previous proceedings?
Standard of Review: Same as above.
Preservation: In the post-conviction action below, the State argued that the claim
was barred because it could have been raised in Tillman's prior petitions. The State appeals
from the court's order granting the petition for post-conviction relief.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal:
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-101 through § 78-35a110 (1996) - the text is contained in Addendum B.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C - the text is contained in Addendum C.
Capital felony - Sentencing proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1982) - the
text is contained in Addendum D.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As summarized in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (Tillman /), this case
arises from a May 1982 murder. Tillman, acting upon a preconceived plan, entered Mark
Schoenfeld's house at night, struck the sleeping Schoenfeld in the head with an ax, and then
set fire to his bed while Schoenfeld was still alive. At the time, Schoenfeld had been dating
Tillman's former girlfriend, suggesting jealousy as the motive. Carla Sagers, Tillman's new
girlfriend, accompanied and aided Tillman. Sagers testified against Tillman at his trial.
The trial jury found Tillman guilty of first degree murder (now called aggravated
murder, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1995). In the ensuing penalty hearing, the jury
sentenced him to death. Tillman /, 750 P.2d at 550-51. This Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence in Tillman I.
Tillman then filed his first state petition for habeas corpus (or extraordinary relief)The third district court denied the petition. On appeal, this Court affirmed that denial and
again upheld the conviction and sentence in Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993)
{Tillman //), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S. Ct. 706 (1994).
Tillman next sought federal habeas relief (Case No. 94C-254G). The federal petition
was dismissed without prejudice, because Tillman had not exhausted state remedies on all
of his alleged grounds for relief (Order 10 April 1995; Magistrate Report & Recommendation
16 March 1995).
Tillman then filed a second petition for state habeas relief directly in this Court,
attempting to raise his unexhausted claims. After briefing and oral argument, this Court
4

ordered

The State s motion to dismiss is granted The petitioner's clauns are procedural

barred from consideration by this court ' Tillman \ Cook, Ltah Supreme Court No 950 TS
Order 18 June 1995 (Tillman IIT)
On March 8 1994, Tillman filed a second federal petition for writ of habeas corpus
(ca^e no 95-CV-731 B) That petition was denied in Tillman v Cook, 25 F Supp 2d 1245
(D Ltah 1998) (Tillman 11) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in Til/man \
Cook.2\5 F3d 1116 (10th Cir ) cert denied 531 US 1055, 121 S Ct 664 (2000) ( Tillman

After the United States Supreme Court denied Tillman's petition for writ of certiorari,
an execution date was set for June 24, 2001 Tillman then filed a Petition for Commutation
of Death Sentence before the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (which stayed the execution
date) The commutation hearing began on June 12, 2001, but was continued due to health
problems of Tillman's counsel. An order terminating the commutation proceedings and
vacating the commutation hearing was filed on September 13, 2001 A new execution date
was scheduled for October 12, 2001. However, by stipulation of the parties, that execution
date was stayed because Tillman filed the petition for post-conviction relief at issue on
September 11,2001.
In his petition, Tillman alleged that the prosecutor improperly injected religion into
his closing argument. On August 30, 2002, the post-conviction court dismissed that claim
as being procedurally barred (addendum A, PR. 736). That decision is not at issue in this
appeal. Tillman also alleged that the prosecution violated his rights by failing to disclose
5

exculpatory evidence. An evidentiary hearing on this issue was held on December 16-17.
2002. On January 24, 2003, the third district court entered a ruling w hich partially granted
the petition for post-conviction relief (addendum A). Tillman's conviction \\ as not vacated,
how ever the district court ordered that Tillman's sentence of death be vacated and that a new
sentencing hearing be convened. The State timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The Murder: On the night of May 25-26, 1982, Elroy Tillman and Carla Sagers
snuck into Mark Schoenfeld's home. Tillman crept into the bedroom (R.955, 962-66).:
While Mark Schoenfeld was asleep in his own bed, Tillman repeatedly bludgeoned him in
the head with an ax (R. 967, 970, 977). Some of the blows to Schoenfeld's head were made
with such severe force that theyfracturedhis skull (R. 517, 525). An autopsy revealed that
the blows to the head had caused severe skull fractures and bruises and lacerations to the
brain. (R. 517-19). While Schoenfeld was still alive, Tillman lit the bed on fire in an attempt
to hide the murder (R. 521-22, 969, 971, 977, 1150). The primary cause of death was
asphyxiation from carbon monoxide poisoning (R. 515-16, 521-22). Although the head

1

For purposes of this appeal, the State is not disputing that the first two prongs of
the Brady requirements have been met. Therefore, in an effort to keep this brief as
succinct as possible, some facts elicited at the evidentiary hearing which relate solely to
those requirements have not been included here.
2

The underlying criminal trial record was included as part of the record before the
court in the post-conviction case (PR. 729; 801:16-17). References to the record in the
criminal case will be designated as (R.
). References to the record in the postconviction case will be designated as (PR. )
6

injuries did not result in Schoenfeld's iinmediate death, the resulting brain damage would
have been fatal independent of the fire(R. 518, 527, 541). At the time of the murder (and
the fire), a couple lived in an apartment in the basement of Schoenfeld's house (R. 624-25.
912-13).
After the Murder: After the murder, Tillman and Carta Sagers drove along the old
airport road, stopping to burn a towel and clothing taken from Schoenfeld's home. Thev then
drove along Redwood Road to where it crosses the Jordan River and threw the ax into the
river. They continued on Redwood Road towards Bountiful, and as they drove, Sagers threw
out the window the gloves Tillman wore during the murder (R. 979-983, 1129-1132).
Pursuant to Ms. Sagers' directions, police officers found a piece of burned terrycloth
and what looked to be part of a shirt along the old airport road. They also found a pair of
gloves at the side of Redwood Road about a mile north of the Jordan River bridge (R. 989,
1264-1272, 1302, 1340-41). The ax was never recovered; however, a police officer testified
that a little over a month prior to the murder, he had pulled Tillman over and saw an ax lying
on the floor behind the driver's seat. Tillman told the officer that he used it as a hammer
when working on his car (R. 642-650).
Why Tillman was the main suspect: Tillman was Lori Groneman's former boyfriend
and the victim, Mark Schoenfeld, was Ms. Groneman's new boyfriend (R. 652,656, 659-60,
662,664). Conversations with Ms. Groneman led the police to Tillman (R. 1360). Tillman
and Ms. Groneman had had a tumultuous relationship (R. 652-659, 670-672). Tillman had
repeatedly called Ms. Groneman on the telephone, and threatened to kill Ms. Groneman and
7

her famil) (R 671-73, 717-24, 830) Tillman had threatened to blow-up the Groneman
family

On another occasion, Tillman told Ms Groneman that he knew where to get a

machine gun and how to use it. Twice during the early spring of 1982, Tillman told Ms
Groneman that he ne\er forgot and that when she least expected it, he would catch her
unaware and carry out his threats (R. 752-788).
Tillman also forced his new girlfriend, Carla Sagers, to call and make threats to Mb
Groneman (R. 681 -84, 734, 840-41, 847, 858-59, 862-67, 1009) Tillman had also follow ed
Ms. Groneman and Mr. Schoenfeld several times (R. 672, 688-94)
Prior to the murder, Tillman had discussed and taken steps towards various means of
killing Ms. Groneman and/or Mr. Schoenfeld. Tillman had Carla Sagers purchase guns for
him, and he built a silencer for a gun (870, 873-74, 880-81,883-84, 1020, 1042). Tillman
had also previously (and unsuccessfully) attempted to get Sagers to shoot Schoenfeld (R
879, 919-21, 925, 1061). Tillman discussed putting weed poison or rat poison into some
Pepsi or Coke, and he showed Sagers the Pepsi or Coke in which he had put weed poison (R
902, 904, 1023-24). Sagers had purchased rat poison and had given it to Tillman (R 903)
Tillman had also discussed using a home-made bomb to kill Groneman and/or Schoenfeld.
Tillman actually made a practice bomb out of dynamite that he tested by setting it off in a
cement block (R. 894-900, 907, 1048).
Tillman fs alibi: Based on information from Ms. Groneman, police picked Tillman
up for questioning on May 26, 1982, the day Schoenfeld's body was discovered. After being
read his "Miranda" rights, Tillman agreed to make a statement. Tillman said he knew
8

nothing about Mark Schoenfeld, and denied ever being in the area of Schoenfeld'* hoibe i R
1310) He also gave the police an alibi for the night of the murder, claiming that he \\ a> u ith
Carla Sagers and that the> had gone up to the Ogden area and then up to Pmev iew Reserv oir
(R 1311-14) He claimed that they arrived back at his apartment between 11 45 and 12 00
and that Carla Sagers had stayed all night at his apartment with him (R 1314-15)
Statements by Carla Sagers: Carla Sagers left for California on business the morning
of May 26, 1982 The police picked her up at the airport upon her return on Mav 28h
During the first hour of questioning, Ms Sagers confirmed Tillman's alibi (R 987, 1300)
But when confronted with information that a threatening call to Ms Groneman had been
traced to her phone number, Ms Sagers changed her story and told police about the murder
(R. 1145-46, 1306-1307). She also told police that the alibi story was Tillman's idea (R
986-87)
Ms Sagers ended up giving numerous statements. In his petition, Tillman conceded
that4 [t]he following transcribed statements by Sagers were provided to the defendant prior
to trial in this matter: (1) an interview of Sagers conducted by Detective Chapman on May
28, 1982 at 4 40 p.m., (2) an interview with Sagers conducted by Detective Chapman on May
28, 1982 at 9*35 p m.; (3) a deposition of Sagers taken by deputy county attorney Michael
Christensen on July 21, 1982; and (4) testimony offered by Sagers at the preliminary hearing
in this matter on August 18, 1982. At trial, Tillman's counsel referred to these statements
during cross-examination of Sagers." (PR. 87)

9

Carla Sagers w as granted full immunity and testified against Tillman at trial The jur\
was aw are ofthe fact that Vis Sagers had been given full immunity (PR 801 54, R 995-96)
The Polygraph Exams: Prior to trial, Ms Sagers was given three (3) poKgraph
exams (PR 801 20) The first polygraph exam was given by Salt Lake Police lieutenant Bill
Robinson (PR 801 21, 135) That first exam was given early in the case, probablv before
the end of May 1982 (PR. 801 21) The second and third polygraph exams were given to \U
Sagers close to the tune of trial (PR 801 20) These exams were given by Sgt Thirsk of the
Salt Lake Police department (PR 801 134) The exact dates are not clear, but the exams w ere
probably given on or about December 8, 1982 and January 3, 1983 (PR 801 134, 138,20)
The trial began on January 4, 1983 (R. 384).
What Counsel for Tillman Knew at Trial: From the trial record, it is clear that
counsel for Tillman knew that Carla Sagers had been given three polygraph exams, and that
in relation to those exams, lengthy pre-exam interviews and post-exam interrogations had
been performed.
At trial, in a hearing out of the presence of the jury, Tillman's counsel asked Sgt
Thirsk: "And after that [polygraph] examination was given, you had what we call post-test
interviews with her, did you not?" Thirsk responded: "Yes, post test interrogation " (R
1582). Tillman's counsel then asked: "And during that post-test interrogation Miss Sagers
said some things we have expressed interest in and desire to have you testify about; is that
your understanding?" (R. 1583). Tillman's counsel knew that these interviews were lengthy
Sgt Thirsk testified that one of his interrogations began at 10*00 a.m. and ended at
10

approximate!} 4 00 p m (R 598)

\t the motion m limine, Thirsk testified that the total

period of pre- and post-test interrogation wa* between eight and ten hours (R 1717)
Counsel for Tillman also knew that Vis Sagers had been giv en three polv graph exams
During his motion in limine testimony when asked how many tests were given, Sgt Thirsk
testified

To my knowledge, three total, two by myself, and one bv Lt Robinson

(PR

802 207 and R 1711)
Based on the court's ruling on the motion in limine, Sgt Thirsk w as allow ed to testitv
about his interviews and interrogation of Carta Sagers, but was not allowed to tell the jurv
that he was a polvgrapher or that these conversations were before or after a polv graph exam
(PR 801 122, 178, 802 222, and R 1583-84) Tillman's counsel called Sgt Thirsk as a
defense witness at trial, and Thirsk testified in front of the jury about the conversations that
occurred at his pre-test interviews and post-test interrogations of Carla Sagers (PR 801 12223, 178 and R 1586-1610)
Counsel for Tillman also knew that Sgt Thirsk had questioned Carla Sagers' v eracitv
Sgt Thirsk testified in front of the jury that. "During that conversation at one point I told her
that I did not believe her answers to my questions and told her that I believed she had in fact
struck Mark and I made that accusation;' (PR 801 113, 179-80, 802 223 and R 1588)
The Partial Transcripts at Issue: In 2001, at a hearing before the Board of Pardons
and Parole, in relation to the commutation proceeding, counsel for Tillman requested
documents related to the polygraph exams of Carla Sagers (PR 111,801 10) In response
to that request, the assistant attorney general representing the state provided documents to
11

Tillman's counsel, including two partial transcripts of pre- or post-polygraph inter\ ie\\ s or
interrogations of Carla Sagers (PR. 801:10)/ The partial transcripts came from files the
assistant attorney general received from the Salt Lake District Attorney's office (PR. 421.
801:11, 89). Tillman's counsel stated that they had never seen the partial transcripts before
(PR. 112:801:10,802:202,218).
Post-Conviction Counsel. Following trial, Tillman's post-conviction counsel "did
not ask the State for an opportunity to examine the State's files during the original state
habeas corpus proceedings." (PR. 802:247).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Failure to disclose evidence favorable to an accused violates due process
where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment. "Such evidence is materialk if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different/" Stnckler v Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119
S.Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999) {quoting United States v BagleyAll U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375
(1985)). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683.
The district court erred in granting the petition for post-conviction relief because
Tillman failed to establish that the evidence was material. The evidence is not material

3

At the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction case, copies of the partial
transcripts were admitted as Exhibits I and 2 (PR. 801:13-14) (addenda E & F).
12

because there is no reasonable probability that had the evidence been timely disclosed, the
result at sentencing would have been different.
Point II. The petition for post-conviction relief at issue in this appeal was a
successi\ e petition. Tillman had previously filed two state petitions for relief both of v\ hich
w ere denied. He raised the current claim in neither. See Tillman II and ///. Under the PostConviction Remedies Act, a petitioner is not eligible for relief upon any ground that "could
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief/' Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-l06(l)(d). Once the State asserts a defense under this provision, as the State
did in this case, the burden shifts to the petitioner to prove that he could not have raised the
claim in a prior petition. Tillman did not meet that burden.
The partial transcripts from the polygraph interviews were found in files provided by
the district attorney's office when the office of the Attorney General requested their files in
relation to the commutation proceeding. Tillman's counsel for his prior petitions could also
have discovered the partial transcripts through the exercise of reasonable diligence, if they
had ever asked for, looked at, or subpoenaed the district attorney's files. However, Tillman's
post-conviction counsel never asked for, looked at, or subpoenaed the district attorney' s files.
Because the partial transcripts could have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, and this claim could then have been raised in Tillman's prior petitions,
Tillman is not entitled to relief in this successive petition. This is an independent basis tor
reversal of the post-conviction court's ruling.

13

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE TILLMAN FAILED
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE WAS
MATERIAL.

In his petition, Tillman argued that he \\ as entitled to post-conv iction relief because
his Constitutional due process rights were violated when the prosecution failed to disclose
transcripts of polygraph interviews of Carla Sagers. Tillman alleged that this \\ as a \ iolation
of the Brady rule. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that "suppression b> the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request v iolates due process \\ here the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83
S.Ct. 1194, 1196(1963).
In order to establish a Brady violation, Tillman must demonstrate that (1) the
prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to him, and (3) he was
prejudiced. Stncklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936(1999). For purposes of
this appeal, the State does not dispute that the first and second Brady requirements hav e been
met.4

4

As to the first Brady requirement, it is undisputed that the partial transcripts were
located in a file obtained from the county attorney's office. As to the second Brady
requirement, the transcripts do not contain any facts that are exculpatory as to Tillman.
However, they do contain information that could be used for impeachment as to Carla
Sagers, and impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the Brady
rule. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985).
14

The post-conviction court was '"unconvinced that a different outcome of the guilt
phase of the trial would have resulted even if the additional impeachment evidence had been
known and utilized b> defense counsel " (addendum A, PR 757) Therefore, Tillman ^
conviction was not overturned. However, the post-conviction court found
it is probable that, armed with the additional impeaching information
contained in the partial transcripts and the audio recordings, defense counsel
would have further undermined the credibility of Ms Sagers testimon>
concerning her participation in the murder of Mr Schoenfeld and, therefore
it is also probable that her moral culpability for the homicide would hav e risen
in the mind of at least one juror
There is, therefore, a reasonable
probability that had the partial transcripts been disclosed, the outcome of the
penalty phase would have been different It follows from this conclusion that
the State's failure to disclose the partial transcripts prejudiced Petitioner,
thereby violating the Brady rule .
(addendum A, PR. 758-59) The post-conviction court therefore ordered that Tillman's death
sentence be vacated and that a new sentencing hearing be held (addendum A, PR 751)
The post-conv iction court erred because Tillman did not and cannot establish the third
prong of Brady - he cannot establish that he was prejudiced because he did not and cannot
establish that the undisclosed evidence was material. Evidence is "material" '"if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."' Strickler v Greene, 527 U S 263, 280, 119 S Ct
1936 (1999) (quoting United States v Bagley, 473 U S 667, 682, 105 S Ct 3375 (1985))
In this case, Tillman must establish a reasonable probability that had the transcripts been
timely disclosed, he would not have received the death penalty.
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The materiality of undisclosed evidence "must be evaluated in the context of the entire
record." United States v. Agiirs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976); accord State
v Martin. 1999 UT 72, «1 9, 984 P.2d 975. It is not enough to simply show that the
undisclosed evidence might have allowed the defense to weaken a particular witness.
Tillman bears the burden of proving that there was a Brady violation. In a petition for postconviction relief, tw[t]he petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." Utah Code Ann. $ 7835a-105 (1996). See also United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994)
(defendant bears the burden of proving a Brady violation). It is Tillman's burden to show
that in light of aU of the evidence, it is reasonably probable that a different sentence would
have been imposed.
Not every violation of the duty to disclose establishes that the outcome was unjust.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). 4t[S]trictly speaking,
there is never a real 'Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is
a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different
verdict." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999).
The post-conviction court erred in granting the petition and setting aside Tillman's
death sentence. Tillman failed to establish that the undisclosed evidence was material, and
that he was prejudiced by the fact that it was not timely disclosed. The evidence is not
material because even if the partial transcripts had been timely provided to Tillman's trial
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counsel, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of sentencing would have been
different
\.

The fact that Carla Sagers laughed during her
interviews does not establish a reasonable probabilitv
that Tillman would not have received the death
penalty.

The post-conviction court focuses on the fact that the transcripts ot Carla Sagers
interviews include instances transcribed ask (laugh) " Tillman apparently did not see thi* a^
significant, because his petition, memorandum of points and authorities in support ot his
petition, and his reply to the State's response, nowhere mention the fact that the partial
transcripts included notations indicating laughter b> Carla Sagers (R 1-7 80-108, 504-519)
The issue was never raised or addressed until the evidentiary hearing when the
polygraphed Sgt Thirsk, testified that "it was something that I noted all during our contact
on both occasions, she tended to laugh a lot or giggle a lot So it is something I noted " (PR
801 163) After the evidentiary hearing, Tillman latched onto the laughter issues since it is
the only item Tillman's counsel may not have known about at the time of trial
The post-conviction court bases its decision on this trivial and immaterial detail The
court states that the partial transcripts "contain numerous references to levity on the part of
Vis Sagers." (addendum A, PR. 752) The court goes on to state that the context "indicates
that Ms Sagers was likely exhibiting inappropriate levity " (addendum A, PR 754)
However, it is merely the court's personal interpretation and opinion that it was inappropriate
levity It is just as likely (perhaps even more likely) that it was simply a nervous response
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to being interrogated In his testimony at the e\ identiarv hearing, w hen asked if the laughter
seemed like it was nenous laughter or more lighthearted. Thirsk said

k

Both ' (R 801 164)

In addition, even if the laughter were "inappropriate levity" rather than a simple
nerv ous reaction, that is not enough to entitle Tillman to a new sentencing hearing The fact
that Ms Sagers Awn have exhibited inappropriate lev it> in an interv tew with the polvgrapher
does not establish any reasonable probability that Tillman w ould not hav e receiv ed the death
penalty Vis Sagers's laughter (whether nervousness or levity) does not reduce Tillman'*
guilt or reduce the aggravating factors which justified imposition of the death penalty
The post-conviction court erroneously concludes that Ms Sagers' inappropriate lev ity
"certainly would have assisted trial counsel in painting a picture of Ms Sagers as someone
who was not to be believed." (addendum A, PR. 754-55). This conclusion from the
underlying facts is a leap not supported by any evidence or authority. There is no basis for
the court's assumption that the fact diat a witness laughed while being interviewed means
that the witness should not be believed. If counsel were able to convince the jury that Ms
Sagers' laughter were inappropriate, it might establish that Ms. Sagers was a more
reprehensible person, but it would not establish that she was a liar It does not change her
credibility as to her description of events on the night of the murder. Even if the court's
assumption were supportable, it still does not establish a reasonable probability that the
outcome of Tillman's sentencing would have been different.
In addition, questions about Ms. Sagers' demeanor during her conversations with Sgt.
Thirsk were already asked at trial. The court asked Sgt. Thirsk: "Didn't you ask her
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questions about how she felt about this case, Mr. Thirsk?" Thirsk answered: "I don't recall
specific conversation about her feelings." (addendum G, R. 1607). The prosecutor then
asked: "Did you see her cry?" and Thirsk responded: "I sav\ her cry w hen she was \\ ith > ou."
(R. 1607). The prosecutor then asked: "Did she seem real happy about being there and the
circumstances of her involvement?" and Thirsk responded: "No, sir, not happy at all."
(addendum G, R. 1608).
The post-conviction court states that the "evidence would likely have had added
impact upon the jury had the audio recordings themselves been disclosed and plaved."
(addendum A, PR. 755). The court says this would have "permitted defense counsel to focus
on any of Ms. Sagers' patterns of speech, intonation, pauses, or other nuances of speech that
may be relevant to her credibility." The court has no facts or evidence on which to base this
assumption. The court has not listened to the audio recordings, because no audio recordings
have been found. The court's assumption that the tapes would have been helpful to Tillman
is without support. It is just as likely that the tapes could have helped to establish Ms.
Sagers' credibility, and could have been extremely damaging to Tillman.
In addition, it is doubtful that the tapes could have been admitted at trial. Since Car la
Sagers testified in person at trial, she could have been questioned about her statements to Sgt.
Thirsk, including whether she laughed. The tapes could only have been admitted as
impeachment evidence if her testimony at trial differed from what she said on the tapes. See
Utah R Evid. 607 and 608.
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Although not stated in exactly these terms, the post-conv iction court seems to impK
that the tapes could have been admitted to establish that Carla Sagers had a bad character
because she laughed inappropriately. However, evidence of a vvitnesses' character is not
generally admissible See Utah R Exid 404 & 608 "Specific instances of the conduct of
a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence." Utah R Exid 608(b), w/J

see State x Speer, 750 P 2d 186, 188-89 (Utah 1988).
Carla Sagers testified at trial. The jury had the opportunity to see and hear from C aria
Sagers in person. They had the opportunity to evaluate her demeanor and patterns of speech
It is for the jury to determine her credibility and decide whether they believed her testimony
about the events that occurred on the night of the murder. State v Workman, 852 P 2d 981,
984 (Utah 1993). Tapes from a polygraph interview would not have been more significant
than Carla Sagers' own testimony in front of the jury at trial.
Finally, it is doubtful that tapes5 of Carla Sagers1 interviews could have been played
to the jury at the penalty phase. If the purpose of playing the tapes at the penalty phase had
been to attack the character of Caria Sagers, then the tapes should have been excluded as
irrelevant. As discussed in section B below, Carla Sagers' character would not have been
relevant at Tillman's sentencing hearing. In addition, even if Tillman's counsel were allowed

5

In discussing tapes, it should be remembered that no tapes have ever been
discovered. Although tapes must have existed at one time, so that they could be
transcribed, there is no evidence that the tapes still existed at the time of the penalty
phase.
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to play the tapes, the prosecution would almost certainly have called Carla Sagers as a
rebuttal witness following admission of the tapes.
There is no reasonable probability that timely disclosure of the transcripts would ha\ e
changed the outcome of Tillman's sentencing hearing. The fact that Carla Sagers laughed
while being interviewed by the polygrapher does not establish a reasonable probability of a
different outcome at Tillman^s sentencing hearing.
B.

The "moral culpability" of Carla Sagers does not
establish a reasonable probability that Tillman would
not have received the death penalty.

Under Utah's statute governing capital felony sentencing proceedings, there are two
admissibility requirements: "The evidence must (I) be relevant to the sentence and (2) have
probative force." State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 651 (Utah 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3207 (2) (1982) (addendum D). The degree of Carla Sagers' "moral culpability" would not
have been admissible at Tillman's sentencing hearing because it is irrelevant to Tillman's
sentence. There is no reasonable probability that Carla Sagers' "moral culpability" would
have changed the outcome of Tillman's sentencing hearing.
The post-conviction court states that "jurors at the penalty phase are required to make
an individualized assessment of the moral culpability of the defendant." (addendum A, PR.
757). The court goes on to state that "Ms. Sagers' moral culpability for the murder of Mr.
Schoenfeld, therefore, is evidence that mitigates against imposition of a death sentence
against Petitioner." (Id. at PR 757-58). This analysis is incorrect for several reasons.
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First, it is unclear exactly what the court means when it uses the term "moral
culpability." If it is an evaluation of Ms. Sagers' religious or moral beliefs, or her understanding of right and wrong, or how guilty she felt about participating in this crime, those
issues are irrelevant to Tillman's guilt or the sentence he received.
Second, if the term "moral culpability" refers to Ms. Sagers' character, or \\ hether she
was a nice person, this is also irrelevant to Tillman's guilt or the sentence he received. In
addition, in light of the numerous other statements Ms. Sagers had given, the partial
transcripts do not establish Ms. Sagers' "moral culpability." They shed no new light on her
character, except for establishing that she laughed while being interviewed by the
polygrapher. As discussed above, the fact that Ms. Sagers laughed while being interviewed
does not establish any reasonable probability of a different outcome for Tillman at
sentencing.
Third, even if the transcripts did establish Ms. Sagers "moral culpability," her "moral
culpability" is not a relevant mitigating factor as to whether Tillman should have received
the death penalty. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (addendum D). c"[T]he primary goal in
[a capital] sentencing phase is to acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and
history of the person before the court/" Carter, 888 P.2d at 652, (quoting State v Taylor,
818 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 966 (1992)). "[Ejvidence not
bearing on the defendant's character, prior record or the circumstances of his offense" may
be properly excluded by the trial court as irrelevant. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, n.
12, 98 S.Ct. 2978, 2964, n. 12 (1978); State v Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 286 (Utah 1989).
22

Carta Sagers' degree of "moral culpability" has no bearing on Tillman's character,
history, prior criminal record, or his commission of the murder. Allowing Tillman to
introduce evidence of Ms. Sagers' "moral culpability" would improperly shift the focus of
the proceeding from Tillman to Sagers. See Carter. 888 P.2d at 652 (permitting State to
introduce victim impact evidence shifts focus from defendant to victim).
Carla Sagers' "moral culpability" is irrelevant and should not have been admitted at
the penalty phase. Therefore, even if the undisclosed transcripts had been provided to
Tillman's trial counsel, there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome at
sentencing.
The post-conviction court's analysis misinterprets jurors responsibility at the penalty
phase. It is not the responsibility of jurors to make an assessment of the "moral culpability"
of other parties involved in the crime who they are not sentencing. "[Requiring the
sentencer to examine and compare the relative culpability of the defendants and the
circumstances in aggravation and mitigation applicable to each would unnecessarily
complicate an already difficult task." People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d258, 620 N.E. 2d 339, 348,
189Ill.Dec.371 (1993); and see State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 286 (Utah \9S9) (referring
to Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 815 (Miss. 1984), cert, denied 469 U.S. 1117, 1015
S.Ct. 803 (1985)) ('the trial court was not required to allow evidence concerning the
characters of other capital murder defendants.")
Numerous courts have found that disposition of a codefendant's case is not relevant
at the penalty phase. People v. Emerson, 189 I11.2d 436, 727 N.E. 2d 302, 338, 245 Ill.Dec.
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49 (2000) ("evidence of a codefendant's sentence is not a relevant mitigating factor at the
aggravation-mitigation stage, where the focus is on the defendant's character and
participation in the offense."); Stewart v State. 662 So.2d 552, 562 (Miss. I995)("ev idence
of a co-defendant's sentence was not relevant evidence in the sentencing decision"); People
v RieL 11 Cal. 4th 1153, 1223, 998 P.2d 969, 1018, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1 (2000) (the disposition
of a co-defendant's case "is not relevant to the decision at the penalty phase, \\ hich is based
on the character and record of the individual defendant and the circumstances of the
offense.") (quoting People v Mincey, 1 CaUth 408, 476, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388
(1992)) (italics in original); People v. Page, 156 111.2d 258, 620 N.E. 2d 339, 347, 189
111.Dec. 371 (1993) ("evidence that a codefendant received a sentence less than death is not
a proper mitigating factor for consideration at a death penalty hearing.").
Making a decision about whether to impose the death penalty against a defendant
involves inquiry only into the culpability of that defendant. The decision whether to impose
the death penalty should reflect a "reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime

" See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor,

J. concurring). However, the jury may not assess the background and character of other
people involved in the crime, when they are not sentencing those other people.
Ms. Sagers' "moral culpability" is not evidence that would mitigate against imposition
of the death penalty against Tillman. "[P]unishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal defendant/' California v. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545. Ms. Sagers'
character or her degree of "moral culpability" is irrelevant to Tillman's personal culpability,
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character, criminal history, or his degree of responsibility for his o\\ n acts in the commission
of this murder.
The fact that Ms. Sagers may have displayed inappropriate ie\ ity during an inter\ lew,
does not in any way, shape, or form, diminish Tillman's culpability for committing the
murder, or diminish the aggravating factors vv hich supported imposition of the death penalt\.
Inappropriate levity may have shown Ms. Sagers' state of mind, twbut that was not relevant
to determining defendant's culpability." People v Beardslee, 53 Cal.3d 68. 806 P.2d 13 I 1,
1335, 279 Cal.Rptr.276 (1991).

Even if the transcripts established greater "moral

culpability" on the part of Carla Sagers, it does not change the fact that Tillman committed
this murder. And it certainly does not change his character, background, criminal history,
or the aggravating circumstances which caused the jury to impose the death penalty.
In sum, the post-conviction court erred in granting the petition because the transcripts
do not establish Carla Sagers' "moral culpability." In addition, the "moral culpability" of
Ms. Sagers' is not relevant to the sentence imposed against Tillman. Tillman is not entitled
to a new penalty hearing because the transcripts do not establish any reasonable probability
that he would not have received the death penalty.
C.

Cumulative impeachment evidence as to Carla Sagers
does not establish a reasonable probability that
Tillman would not have received the death penalty.

The partial transcripts contain some of Carla Sagers' statements and answers when
being interviewed and/or interrogated by a polygraph examiner. The State has conceded that
some of these statements could have been used for impeachment purposes. However, in the
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transcripts, none of Ms. Sagers' statements about Tillman's actions in committing the nuirder
differ in any significant way from her numerous other statements and prelitninar\ hearing
testimony. The State does not review all of the similarities and consistent statements because
the post-conviction court acknowledged that "much of the information contained in the
partial transcripts is merely cumulative of evidence that \\ as already know n to trial counsel"
(addendum A, PR 759).
Information that is merely cumulative is not material and does not meet the third
Brady requirement. "The government's failure to disclose potentially exculpatory infomiation does not violate Brady 'where a defendant "knew or should have known the essential
facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information," or where the
evidence is available to defendant from another source/" State v Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^|33,
n. i,37P.3d 1073, 1083, rag denied (2002) (quoting United States v Mullins, 22 F. 3d 1365,
1371 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1991)
(quoting United States v Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 85 (2nd Cir. 1988)); and see United States
v Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("The Brady rule does not apply if the
evidence in question is available to the defendant from other sources.")
None of Ms. Sagers' statements in the transcripts are exculpatory as to Tillman. There
is nothing in those transcriptsfromwhich Tillman's counsel could have argued that Tillman
did not murder Mark Schoenfeld. During the motion in limine at trial, Sgt. Thirsk was
specifically asked: "Did you ever reveal any information from Carla Sagers in your pre or
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posttest interview or polygraphs that would indicate that she was the only one responsible
for the killing of Mark Schoenfeld." Sgt. Thirsk responded: "No." (addendum G, R. 1725)
At most, the partial transcripts contain information which could be used as additional
impeachment evidence against Carla Sagers. At trial, the strategy of Tillman's counsel \\ as
to challenge the credibility of Carla Sagers (PR. 802:208). Consequently, Tillman's counsel
extensively cross-examined Carla Sagers based on her prior statements and her preliminar>
hearing testimony. They pointed out numerous inconsistencies in their attempt to impeach
or discredit her (addendum H,R. 995-1153, 1168-1172). They also attempted to demonstrate
that Ms. Sagers was more involved in the murder than she let on in her direct testimony
(addendum H, R. 802:209, R. 995-1153, 1168-1172). In closing argument at the penalty
phase, counsel for Tillman said:
The State admitted it was incorrect testimony and Carla Sagers forgot
to tell you some important things that she appears to have mentioned to Det.
Thirsk about her complicity in the event. They lied a little bit. How do we
know the extent of it? How can you impose death when some of the people
on whom this verdict rests have materially falsified themselves. . .
(R. I960). The strategy of attempting to discredit Carla Sagers was fully presented to the
jury at the guilt and penalty phase. Nothing in the undisclosed transcripts would have added
anything of significance to the cross-examination already performed by Tillman's counsel.
As the post-conviction court acknowledged, "information relevant to the credibility of Ms.
Sagers contained in the partial transcripts is, for the most part, the same information that was
used during trial to attack Ms. Sagers' truthfulness." (addendum A, PR. 751).
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In his direct appeal, Tillman argued that "the polygraph evidence would ha\ e had the
effect of impeaching the credibility of Sagers as a witness" Tillman /, 750 P.2d at 558. This
Court found that "the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in excluding evidence of
the polygraph test, the examination results, and the examiner's opinion." Tillman I, 750 P.2d
at 557. In addition, this Court held that "the question of [Sagers'] own degree of culpability,
the possibility that she was lying about her own participation, and the resulting implications
as to her credibility generally were well developed for the jury's consideration." hi at 559
This Court stated:
at its strongest, the excluded testimony tended only to show that Carla Sagers
may have been lying when she denied actually holding the ax or striking any
of the blows, not that her testimony about defendant's acts was untrue. Thus,
the testimony was not exculpatory as to defendant, but only potentially
inculpatory as to Sagers.
Tillman /, 750 P.2d at 557-58. This Court went on to say that "it appears that there is no
likelihood that the jury would have reached another conclusion regarding defendant's guilt
had it known that a polygraph examination showed Sagers to be deceptive about her
participation in the murder/' Id. at 558.
Similarly here, the transcripts may contain some information that could have been
used to attempt to impeach Sagers' credibility. However all or almost all of that same
information was already available to Tillman's counsel from Sagers' prior statements and her
preliminary hearing testimony, and was used at trial. Indeed, questions about Ms. Sagers'
credibility were already well developed infrontof the jury. In addition, the transcripts do
not contain any information to show that her testimony about Tillman's actions was untrue.
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The transcripts are not exculpatory as to Tillman. Cumulative impeachment ev idence against
Carta Sagers does not establish any reasonable probability that Tillman would not ha\e
received the death penalty.
D.

Information in the transcripts as to possible coaching
and incredulity toward Carla Sagers, does not
establish a reasonable probability that Tillman would
not have received the death penalty.

The post-conviction court found that "the transcripts contain additional information
relating to Sgt. Thirsk's incredulity toward Ms. Sagers1 account of her role in the murder of
Mark Schoenfeld, [and] the appearance of coaching during the interviews . . . which could
have been used to further undermine the credibility of Ms. Sagers." (addendum A, PR. 759).
However Thirsk's disbelief of Sagers is nothing new. At trial, Tillman was aware of
Sgt. Thirsk's incredulity toward Ms. Sagers. The possibility of coaching is also nothing new.
Questions concerning the appearance of coaching were already asked at trial. Therefore, this
information is merely cumulative and is not material under Brady.
1.

Thirsk's disbelief of Sagers does not
establish a reasonable probability that
Tillman would not have received the
death penalty.

The fact that the transcripts may have contained additional information relating to Sgt.
Thirsk's incredulity toward Ms. Sagers does not make the transcripts material. Thirsk's
opinion would have been inadmissible. Even if admitted, the additional information the State
could have presented about why Thirsk held those opinions would have been damaging to
Tillman.

Thirsk's incredulity toward Ms. Sagers does not establish any reasonable
2?

probability that if the transcripts had been timely disclosed to Tillman's trial counsel, the
outcome of sentencing would have been different.
\t trial Sgt. Thirsk testified in front of the jury that he told Ms Sagers that he "did
not believe her answers to my questions" (addendum G, R. 1588). Although the transcripts
include additional questions and answers which display Thirsk's incredulity toward Ms
Sagers, they provide no new information, because Tillman's counsel already knew that
ThLrsk had expressed his disbelief of Sagers.
Tillman alleged in his petition that "although the polygraph tests were inadmissible,
this transcribed interview demonstrating the detective's6 disbelief of Sagers would have been
admissible and would have devastated her credibility." (PR. 89). In fact, testimony of Sgt.
Thirsk's opinion would not have been admissible. This issue was already resolved against
Tillman on appeal. At trial, Sgt. Thirsk was permitted to testify in the guilt phase about his
questions and Sagers' answers during the post-polygraph interrogation. However, he was
not permitted to testify concerning his opinion that some of Sagers1 responses were
deceptive.7 'That opinion testimony was excluded at both the guilt and the penalty phases."
Tillman L 750 P.2d at 557. On appeal, Tillman argued that exclusion of Thirsk's opinion

6

Thirsk was not a detective. He was a sergeant with the Salt Lake police {see R
1699 & PR. 494).
7

However, Thirsk was allowed to testify before the jury that at one point during
the interrogation, he told Sagers that he "did not believe her answers to my questions and
told her that I believed she had in fact struck Mark and I made that accusation" (R. 1588).
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testimon} w as error. This Court held that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error m
excluding that opinion testimony, id.
Any current attempt to admit Sgt. Thirsk's opinion would also properly be denied.
This Court has held that "rule 608(a)(1) bars admission of an expert's testimony as to the
truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion." State v Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 338, 392
(Utah 1989). Utah law is very clear that "one witness may not testify as to the credibility of
statements made by another person on a particular occasion." State v Harmon, 956 P 2d
262, 271 (Utah 1998). In addition, Sgt. Thirsk's opinion as to Sagers' credibility does not
change the fact that Tillman committed murder. It does not alter Tillman's degree of
culpability. It does not establish any reasonable probability that the outcome of sentencing
would have been different.
Furthermore, if Sgt. Thirsk had been allowed to testify at trial as to his opinion that
Sagers was deceptive, the State could have asked why he held that opinion. Thirsk had
de\ eloped a personal theory as to Sagers' involvement. Thirsk erroneously believed that the
victim was Sagers' ex-boyfriend (when in fact, the victim was the new boyfriend of
Tillman's former girlfriend) (PR. 497; 801:35). Thirsk's theory was that Tillman had struck
the fatal blows, but that he was very "con-wise" and never would have allowed Sagers to be
present at the murder without making her also strike the victim so as to involve her as an
accomplice (R. 1716; PR. 497; 801:36, 186). This information would have undermined
Thirsk's credibility and would have been damaging, rather than helpful to Tillman's case.
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2.

Possible coaching does not establish a
reasonable probability that Tillman
would not have received the death
penalty.

In his petition, Tillman alleged that the transcripts show that Thirsk "came close to
pressuring [Sagers] to make things up in order to achieve a more convincing narrative effect"
(PR. 90). The post-conviction court found that "the appearance of coaching during the
interviews . . . could have been used to further undermine the credibility of Ms. Sagers/'
(addendum A, PR. 759). However, the possibility of coaching is nothing new. Questions
concerning the appearance of coaching were already asked at trial.
During their direct examination, Tillman's counsel asked Sgt. Thirsk: "did you ever
indicate to Miss Sagers that you wanted her to say or testify that she had hit him?" and "Did
you ever indicate or imply to Miss Sagers that you wanted her to testify falsely?" (addendum
G, R. 1596). Sgt. Thirsk responded "No, sir, I admonished her about doing that." (R. 1596
and PR. 801:184). At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Sgt. Thirsk testified that his
trial testimony was correct and he would give the same answer today if asked whether he had
ever indicated or implied to Ms. Sagers that he wanted her to testify falsely (PR. 801:184).
In addition, a review of the transcripts establishes that the questioner8 merely encouraged
Sagers to tell the truth and not to leave out any details (addenda E & F).

3

It is not clear that the transcripts are both from Sgt. Thirsk's interviews. One
could have been from the first polygraph performed by Lt. Robinson (PR. 801:162).
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For example, in one of the transcripts, the questioner says
Ok. Ok, now you talked to a Detective you've talked to Attorneys and
> oil \ e been ov er this se\ eral tunes but that w e \ e seen already there are things
that you recall even now, ok7 that you didn t recall before And that's the
purpose of discussion to try and get all these memories out, as much as
possible ok) So that you can be honestly sure when I ask you questions about
the incidents ok}
(addendum F, p 15)
At another point, the questioner says
It's not why he did this or what he did, it's what you did, and what you
saw that's important And its got to be the absolute truth It can [sic] be a
variation truth, and it can't be a truth that's leaving something out, its got to
be told, now noone [sic] can tell the same story twice Do you see what 1
mean7
(addendum F, p. 23).
Finally, its important to note that any coaching was actually to Tillman's benefit
Additional questioning caused Sagers to admit more involvement in the case, not less
Tillman's counsel was aware of this at trial. At trial, in front of the jury, Sgt. Thirsk testified
as follows
A
The conversation regarded Carla's particular activities herself during
the incident at Mark Schoenfeld's home. During that conversation at one point
I told her that I did not believe her answers to my questions and told her that
I believed she had in fact struck Mark and I made that accusation.
Q.

Did she respond to that accusation7

A

Yes, she did.

Q

And what was her response?

A.

Her Response was, "If you want me to say I hit him, I will."
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I then said, UI don't want you to say that unless it's the truth Tell me
what happened."
She said, "I will testify that I hit him if that's what you want "
I then asked her, "How many times did you hit him," and ^he
responded, 'Twice."
I then asked, "Which side did you hit lum*"
She said, "The left side."
I then asked, "Which side of the bed were you on '"
\nd she said, "I don't recall "
1 then asked, "Did Tillman hand you the weapon>"
Her response was, "He must have."
1 then asked, "Did Tillman tell you to hit Mark/"
Her response was, "He must have "
I then told her I didn't want to know what must have happened, I
wanted to know what did happen Her response was, "I don't know why I am
telling you this, it isn't true anyway. I didn't hit him."
(addendum G, R. 1588-89).
Pointing out in more detail to the jury that Thirsk may have coached Carla Sagers
would likely have been harmful to Tillman, because it would have established that Thirsk
pressured Carla to admit that she was more involved in the case than she actually was
In summary, Tillman knew all of the factual details that were available in the
undisclosed transcripts, and was able to get most of those details before the jury Sgt Thirsk
testified about his disbelief of Sagers in front of the jury. Questions about whether Thirsk
had coached Sagers were also asked infrontof the jury. Even if the transcripts had been
timely disclosed, there is no reasonable probability of a different sentence.
There was overwhelming evidence of Tillman's guilt and sufficient aggravating
factors to entitled the jury to impose the death penalty. The information contained in the
partial transcripts does not change the amount or the extent of the evidence against Tillman,
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or the aggrav ators w hich subjected him to the death penalty. Tillman is not entitled to postconviction relief because when viewed w ith all of the other evidence, the transcripts are not
material and do not establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome at sentencing.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
BECAUSE THE BRADY ISSUE COULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED IN TILLMAN'S PRIOR PETITIONS.

The petition for post-conviction relief was a successive petition. Tillman had
previously filed two state petitions for relief, both of which were denied. See Tillman 11 and
///. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides that a person is not eligible for postconviction relief upon any ground that "could have been, but was not, raised in a previous
request for post-conviction relief." Utah Code Ann. section 78-35a-l06(l)(d) (addendum
B). Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a petition for postconviction relief "shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of
the conviction or sentence. Additional claims . . . may not be raised in subsequent
proceedings except for good cause shown." Utah R.Civ.P. 65C(c) (addendum C). This bar
is absolute.
"The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove the
existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-l05. In the postconviction case below, the State raised a ground of preclusion, arguing that the Brady claim
could have been raised in a previous petition. Tillman therefore had the burden to disprove
this ground of preclusion.
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The post-conviction court erred in granting the petition because Tillman did not
demonstrate good cause for his failure to include his Brady claun in his previous petitions.
He therefore should not have been granted relief in this successive petition. Tillman alleged
that he was entitled to proceed with his Brady claim in this successive petition because the
alleged Brady material was newly discovered evidence. However, Tillman's post-con\ iction
counsel could have discovered the material through the exercise of reasonable diligence.'
In preparation for the commutation hearing, counsel for the state requested the prosecution
files. Those files were provided by the Salt Lake District Attorney's office. The complained
of transcripts we're found in one of those files (PR. 421; 801:11, 89).
In preparation for petitioner's prior petitions, Tillman's counsel could also have asked
for, or subpoenaed, or asked to review, the files from the District Attorney's office. If they
had done so, they could also have discovered the transcripts. But Tillman's post-conviction
counsel conceded that they "did not ask the State for an opportunity to examine the State's
files during the original state habeas corpus proceedings." (PR. 802:247).
In die underlying criminal case, the prosecutor's office had an open file policy.
Tillman's subsequent counsel claim to have relied on this open file policy. However,
Tillman's post-conviction counsel never actually availed themselves of the open file policy
because they never looked at the district attorney's files.

9

Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, evidence only qualifies as "newly
discovered" if "the evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(e)(i) (addendum B).
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Tillman's post-conviction counsel cannot rely on the open file policy, because they
never availed themselves of the open file policy. They never looked at the prosecutor's files.
Essentially, Tillman's post-conviction counsel argue that they were entitled to rely on trial
counsel's statement that he relied on the open file policy. That is not sufficient.
In Stnckler, the parties relied on an open file policy. However, the Stnckler case is
distinguishable because the undisclosed evidence was not found in the prosecutor's file.
Strickler v Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 276, 278 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 1945-46 (1999). Thus, even if
post-conviction counsel in Stnckler had examined the prosecutor's file, they still would not
have found the disputed documents.
That is not the situation here. The undisclosed transcripts were located in files
obtained from the district attorney's office. Therefore, if Tillman's post-conviction counsel
had looked at the prosecutor's files, they would have timely located the transcripts and could
have raised this issue in Tillman's prior petitions. Because the transcripts could and should
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the claim could have been
raised in Tillman's prior petitions. Therefore, this successive petition should not have been
granted.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should Reverse the portion of the postconviction court's ruling that vacated petitioner Tillman's sentence.
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